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    <title>books</title>
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    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2011-12-27:/books//9</id>
    <updated>2012-01-06T16:16:19Z</updated>
    
    <generator uri="http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/">Movable Type 5.02</generator>

<entry>
    <title>Lawyer Barons: What Their Contingency Fees Really Cost America</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2012/01/lawyer-barons-what-their-contingency-fees-really-cost-america.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2012:/books//9.8880</id>

    <published>2012-01-06T16:11:02Z</published>
    <updated>2012-01-06T16:16:19Z</updated>

    <summary></summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        <![CDATA[In <em>Lawyer Barons: What Their Contingency Fees Really Cost America</em>, Manhattan Institute visiting scholar Lester Brickman makes a broad and deep inquiry into how contingency fees distort our civil justice system, influence our political system and endanger democratic governance. Contingency fees are the way personal injury lawyers finance access to the courts for those wrongfully injured. While the public senses that lawyers manipulate the justice system to serve their own ends, few are aware of the high costs that come with contingency fees. <em>Lawyer Barons</em> sets out to change that, providing a window into the seamy underworld of contingency fees that the bar and the courts not only tolerate but even protect and nurture. Contrary to a broad academic consensus, Lawyer Barons argues that the financial incentives for lawyers to litigate are so inordinately high that they perversely impact our civil justice system and impose other unconscionable costs. It thus presents the intellectual architecture that underpins all tort reform efforts.]]>
        <![CDATA[<strong>Lester Brickman</strong> (Cambridge University Press, February 2011)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>In the Name of Justice: Leading Experts Reexamine the Classic Article &quot;The Aims of the Criminal Law&quot;</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2009/05/in-the-name-of-justice-leading.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2009:/books//9.6285</id>

    <published>2009-05-05T18:27:16Z</published>
    <updated>2009-06-03T18:20:54Z</updated>

    <summary></summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Criminal Law and Prosecution" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        In 1958, the esteemed Harvard Law professor Henry M. Hart developed his theory of the proper aims of criminal law in his seminal article, &quot;The Aims of the Criminal Law.&quot; In this collection of essays, practicing lawyers, judges and academics reexamine the traditional aims of the criminal law in light of recent statutory and jurisprudential changes.  Prominent topics addressed include overcriminalization, the erosion of procedural protections for corporate defendants, and civil enforcement alternatives to criminal prosecution.
        <![CDATA[<strong>Tim Lynch, ed.</strong>, Director, Cato Institute Criminal Justice Project (Cato Institute, 2009)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Lying, Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White Collar Crime</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2007/05/lying-cheating-and-stealing-a.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2009:/books//9.6286</id>

    <published>2007-05-05T18:28:19Z</published>
    <updated>2009-06-03T18:19:56Z</updated>

    <summary></summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Criminal Law and Prosecution" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
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        This philosophically rigorous treatment of white-collar criminal law was awarded the White-Collar Crime Research Consortium&apos;s first annual Outstanding Publication Award. As the Wall Street Journal described it, &quot;Green&apos;s book admirably clears away much of the conceptual underbrush surrounding the idea of white-collar crime.&quot; Professor Green describes the morally ambiguous nature of many white-collar crimes and offers a framework for evaluating the moral wrongfulness (or lack thereof) of the acts often prosecuted in this area of the law.
        <![CDATA[<strong>Stuart P. Green</strong>, Professor of Law and <strong>Justice Nathan L. Jacobs</strong>, Scholar, Rutgers School of Law-Newark (Oxford University Press, 2007)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Judge and Jury: American Tort Law on Trial</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2006/11/judge-and-jury.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2006:/books//9.3204</id>

    <published>2006-11-20T15:30:33Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T20:59:35Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
    
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        <![CDATA[Economists Helland and Tabarrok examine thousands of tort cases to examine the effectiveness of the tort system. Among their conclusions: tort awards and settlements can be affected by jury demographics, income levels, and by partisan judges in states with judicial elections; and while judges and juries are different, their actual decision-making can be remarkably similar. The authors also, controversially, find support for unregulated contingency fees, the subject of a Point of Law featured discussion between Tabarrok and the Manhattan Institute's Jim Copland <a href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/contingent_claims0406.php">here</a>. In addition, Helland and Tabarrok propose solutions to critical flaws in the tort system, including better jury guidance, wider geographic jury pools, less "junk science" in the courtroom, and more reliance on contracts as solutions to traditional tort problems.]]>
        <![CDATA[<strong>Eric A. Helland</strong>, Professor, Claremont-McKenna College; and <strong>Alexander Tabarrok</strong>, Professor, George Mason University (Independent Institute, 2006)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We&apos;ve Learned; How to Fix It</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2006/10/the-sarbanesoxl.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2006:/books//9.3205</id>

    <published>2006-10-20T14:37:27Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:00:28Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        <![CDATA[Enacted in the wake of the Enron collapse and other corporate scandals stemming from the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the Sarbanes-Oxley act placed new regulatory and litigation burdens on U.S. public companies. Butler and Ribstein argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, although a legislative disaster, is not beyond saving.  <em>The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle </em>examines the direct and indirect costs imposed by the recent legislation, and proposes reforms that could mitigate some of its worst effects.  Among their proposals: applying Sarbanes-Oxley to larger corporations only; reducing the internal controls disclosure requirement; and prohibiting private lawsuits based on the Act.  ]]>
        <![CDATA[<strong>Henry N. Butler</strong>, Professor, Chapman University; and <strong>Larry E. Ribstein</strong>, Professor, the University of Illinois College of Law (AEI Press 2006)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Trapped: When Acting Ethically Is Against The Law</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2006/05/trapped-when-acting-ethically.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2009:/books//9.6284</id>

    <published>2006-05-05T18:21:50Z</published>
    <updated>2009-06-03T18:20:29Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Criminal Law and Prosecution" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        <![CDATA[This lucid critique of the current state of white-collar criminal law demonstrates that corporate lawyers and managers must often choose between acting ethically and acting legally.  John Hasnas describes the erosion of traditional <i>mens rea</i> requirements and 5th Amendment protections in federal law and suggests that some recent aggressive prosecutions of corporations and their officers have serious moral costs.]]>
        <![CDATA[<strong>John Hasnas</strong>, Associate Professor, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University (Cato Institute, 2006)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Gimme a Break: How I Exposed Hucksters, Cheats, and Scam Artists and Became the Scourge of the Liberal Media...</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2004/05/gimme-a-break-h.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2004:/books//9.79</id>

    <published>2004-05-13T15:12:49Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:01:12Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Miscellaneous" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
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        The host of the popular newsmagazine 20/20, Stossel describes how he evolved from a &quot;consumer reporter&quot; to a skeptic of the anti-corporate stories he initially pushed. Although Stossel&apos;s book covers far-ranging topics in addition to liability, his chapter on tort law is a good primer for the uninitiated, and his description of how self-interested plaintiffs&apos; lawyers fed him &quot;consumer reports&quot; is illuminating.


        <![CDATA[<b>John Stossel</b>, Host, ABC News 20/20
(Harper Collins, 2004)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2003/11/adversarial-leg.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2003:/books//9.3206</id>

    <published>2003-11-20T15:40:58Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:01:38Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        &quot;Adversarial legalism&quot; is Professor Kagan&apos;s term for &quot;the rambunctious, peculiarly American style of law and legal decisionmaking&quot; exhibited recently in the disputed 2000 presidential election. Not only is such adversarial legalism prominent in America, Kagan argues, but it is also prevalent, &quot;affecting almost every sphere of governmental and economic activity.&quot; It is rooted in the American distrust�and resultant decentralization�of governmental power. The author backs up his argument with comparative law studies, which examine the American adversarial system against other more impersonal systems of regulation and adjudication. The American adversarial system, Kagan concludes, is more inefficient than others, imposing higher costs and resulting in more uncertainty, but it is unclear whether it can be reformed.
        <![CDATA[<strong>Robert A. Kagan</strong>, Professor, University of California at Berkeley (Harvard University Press, 2003)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2003/09/punitive-damage.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2003:/books//9.3207</id>

    <published>2003-09-20T14:43:48Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:02:06Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        <![CDATA[<em>Punitive Damages</em> examines the role of one of the United States� most prized democratic institutions: juries. The authors, including legal experts, psychologists, and an economist, used over 600 mock juries to analyze the decision-making processes of jurors, specifically on the issue of punitive damage awards. The authors learn how jurors make vastly different punitive damage awards�even in factually identical cases�and how this can affect our understanding of the jury institution in a broader context.]]>
        <![CDATA[<strong>Cass R. Sunstein, et al.</strong>, Professor, University of Chicago School of Law (University of Chicago Press, 2002)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Making Tort Law: What Should Be Done and Who Should Do It</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2003/09/making-tort-law.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2003:/books//9.1565</id>

    <published>2003-09-08T15:09:45Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:02:33Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Politics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        In this short, theoretical look at current tort liability law in the United States, Harvard&apos;s Charles Fried and David Rosenberg conclude that deterrence, rather than compensation or redistribution, should be the exclusive goal of tort law. Fried and Rosenberg demonstrate how the current system is overly expense, unpredictable, and inefficient in offering a deterrent to the business practices it seeks to quell, and they contend that legislative action, as opposed to judicial remedies, offer the most promise for reform.


        <![CDATA[<b>Charles Fried</b> and <b>David Rosenberg</b>, Professors, Harvard Law School (AEI Press, 2003)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2003/05/democracy-by-de.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2003:/books//9.57</id>

    <published>2003-05-07T15:34:46Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:03:01Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Regulation Through Litigation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        In this valuable book, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod explain the courts, with the best intentions and often with the approval of elected officials, have come to control ordinary policy making through court decrees. These court regimes, they assert, impose rigid and often ancient detailed plans that can founder on reality. Newly elected officials, who may wish to alter the plans in response to the changing wishes of voters, cannot do so unless attorneys, court-appointed functionaries and lower-echelon officials agree. The result is neither judicial government nor good government, say Sandler and Schoenbrod, and they offer practical reforms that would set governments free from this judicial stranglehold, allow courts to do their legitimate job of protecting rights and strengthen democracy. [ed. 5/1/2004]
        <![CDATA[<b>Ross Sandler</b> and <b>David Schoenbrod</b>, Professors, New York Law School
(Yale University Press, 2003)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>The Rule of Lawyers: How the New Litigation Elite Threatens America&apos;s Rule of Law</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2003/05/the-rule-of-law.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2003:/books//9.56</id>

    <published>2003-05-07T15:32:21Z</published>
    <updated>2011-12-31T18:49:54Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Regulation Through Litigation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        The most recent book from our editor-in-chief, The Rule of Lawyers explores how plaintiffs&apos; lawyers in America have become lawmakers themselves. Typified by the $246 billion tobacco settlement, courtroom assaults have targeted HMOs, gunmakers, lead-paint manufacturers and &quot;factory farms.&quot; Each massive class-action suit seeks to invent new law, and in the process to ban or tax or regulate something that elected lawmakers had chosen to leave alone. And each time the new process works as intended, the new litigation elite reaps billions in fees--which the lawyers invest in fresh rounds of suits, as well as political contributions. [ed. 5/1/2004]
        <![CDATA[<b>Walter Olson</b>, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute
(Truman Talley Books/St. Martin's, 2003)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Regulation Through Litigation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2002/05/regulation-thro.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2002:/books//9.82</id>

    <published>2002-05-13T15:16:29Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:03:53Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Regulation Through Litigation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/">
        This collection of papers is adapted from an eponymous conference held by AEI-Brookings in 2001. Although all litigation regulates in that it encourages and deters behaviors, critics of &quot;regulation through litigation&quot; contend that the incentives provided by modern American tort law do not effectively deter the social costs of accidents without overdeterring helpful behavior; that the system is burdened by extremely high waste and administrative costs; and that using courts to resolve all manner of social questions infringes on the delicate checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches intended by our constitutional framers. The essays in this collection present both sides of the debate.

        <![CDATA[<b>Edited by W. Kip Viscusi</b>, Professor, Harvard Law School
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2002)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2002/05/smokefilled-roo.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2002:/books//9.81</id>

    <published>2002-05-13T15:15:20Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:04:16Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Attorneys&apos; Fees and Ethics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Regulation Through Litigation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
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        One of the nation&apos;s top tort scholars and an expert on products liability generally and tobacco litigation specifically, Viscusi gives a scathing account of the 1998 multistate tobacco settlement. Viscusi argues both that the companies themselves made a mistake in settling and that the states did their citizens a disservice, amounting to little more than placing a large excise tax on the poor. Viscusi&apos;s approachable yet thorough use of medical studies and statistics is likely to have influence on even the most ardent anti-tobacco reader.

        <![CDATA[<b>W. Kip Viscusi</b>, Professor, Harvard Law School
(University of Chicago Press, 2002)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>The Case Against Lawyers</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.pointoflaw.com/books/archives/2002/05/the-case-agains.php" />
    <id>tag:www.pointoflaw.com,2002:/books//9.78</id>

    <published>2002-05-13T15:11:17Z</published>
    <updated>2008-03-05T21:04:38Z</updated>

    <summary> </summary>
    <author>
        <name>pol admin</name>
        
    </author>
    
        <category term="Miscellaneous" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
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        The host of &quot;Catherine Crier Live&quot; on Court TV offers an approachable, well-written account of lawsuit abuse in America. Crier combines her hard-hitting reporting as a journalist, her witty writing style, and her experience as a lawyer and judge to cast her view of a legal system run amok. Crier&apos;s book is easily digestible for the novice and a good introduction to excess litigation.
        <![CDATA[<b>Catherine Crier</b>, Host, Court TV�s Crier Report
(Broadway, 2002)]]>
    </content>
</entry>

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